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Reviewed by Amy Widman
In a county courthouse in Grand Marais, Minnesota, there hangs a framed
corduroy jacket. This jacket was worn by a public defender named James
Sommerness, a lawyer who practiced in this courthouse for decades. Known
for his informality of dress, the memorial is a celebration of access. It is also
seemingly unique among courthouse plaques in its confrontation of the reality
that resources can affect justice and the corresponding need to provide legal
assistance to the poor (372-75).
This is one of the many stories of how we celebrate and perceive the role of
courts throughout the world in Representing Justice, by Judith Resnik and Dennis
Curtis. The book contains an extensive collection of images alongside its text
and is a visual treat, rare among works of legal academia. But beyond the
art historical contributions provided by tracing images of justice throughout
time and geography lies a deeply relevant exploration of the role of courts in
a democracy and contemporary threats against both institutions. The book’s
main premise treats justice, and specifically the development of the modern
court system, as part of a triptych (alongside the postal service and the press)
of modern developments that sustain democratic governance. These three
developments share the commonality of communication, and so it is through
communication that democracy is sustained. As Jeremy Bentham put it, courts,
the press, and the postal service created a “tribunal of public opinion” (14).1 All
three developments are currently facing profound structural challenges (33536).2
Drawing on recurring themes of participation, voice, the power of public
perception, and access to courts, the authors catalog visual portrayals of
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justice in courthouse settings around the world in order to explore various
understandings of the role of law in society. By examining the architecture
and iconography of justice over time, the authors trace the evolution of the
judiciary and judicial process as becoming a governmental role of necessary
transparency. The authors describe this development as a metamorphosis of
“rites” into “rights” (288-305). The public’s participation and education in the
judgment process, through open courts, through a focus on reason-giving,
and the obligation of hearing both sides, flourishes alongside the creation
of an independent judiciary. The court, with its attendant role of dispensing
justice, over time became a place of communication by and for the people and
a constraint on governmental authority.
But this is not the end of the story, and Resnik and Curtis offer a narrative
that is also critical. How does the visual representation of Justice, seen
throughout the world, capture these democratic developments? Can Justice
as a virtue stand alone? What happened to her sister virtues from Renaissance
times and the cohort of Justice with Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude?
Why did Justice survive into modern translations and renderings while the
other three fell off?
The authors posit that Justice survived and thrived as a legitimizing aspect
of state power (7, 8). In this way, Justice gave a stamp of legitimacy to the
state in its judgments; she became a valuable marketing tool, so to speak.3
The authors question the role of this iconography: Should governments only
uphold lofty portrayals of Justice; does the representation of justice do more
than signify legitimacy? Does the visual silence regarding the more difficult
problem of representation’s relationship to power undermine the democratic
value of the court system?
In this spirit the authors continue to unpack the marketing of Justice, asking
whether it is consistent with society’s current valuing of justice. Are the visual
signals in line with a system aiming to afford access for all people? Have the
democratic values of open courts and information dissemination been realized
or co-opted through marketing campaigns and sensationalism, causing justice
to bend toward public perception rather than evidence and facts in a particular
case? Does the iconography of Justice in our courthouses and popular culture
have a role to play in this disconnect? The authors give equal time to exploring
these tensions as well, suggesting that in order to sustain a democracy, the
architecture and iconography must address the dark side of justice’s past, too.
3.
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In order for justice to enhance democracy, it also must reflect the people.
Describing how popular resistance to culturally insensitive representations
of justice in court buildings reflects the public’s ongoing dialogue with
imagery, the authors also note how rare it is for Justice to appear other than
as the traditional white woman with a blindfold. Their exhaustive catalog of
representations of Justice in governmental buildings around the world reveals
merely one depiction of Justice as a woman of color that remains in plain view
(121).4 How does Justice translate as a democratic ideal when it is not reflective
of the people who will be judged?
The institutional architecture of courthouses also speaks to the dominance
of power and the status quo, which can be in tension with access and openness.
In America, a twentieth-century building boom produced large centralized
buildings housing courts, impressively enshrined and stable (154-168). This
time period coincided with an expansion of the role of courts in protecting
rights, the birth of a Legal Services Corporation to provide representation
to those who could not afford a lawyer, and the development of a cohesive
procedural law built on ideas of access. Thus we see a democratically developed
body of law focusing on rights and access to be judged inside buildings
designed to be monumental, central, and stable. In contrast, we see early
twenty-first-century buildings focusing on different themes: security, isolation
of judges from the public by enlarging private chambers and assigning judges
to particular courtrooms, and less adjudication generally taking place in the
courthouse buildings. Art has long been a feature of these types of buildings,
but provocative representations of justice are often quietly provocative, if
present at all. The authors examine recent installations in courthouses by
artists like Tom Otterness and Jenny Holzer for their questioning of how well
justice currently meets its ideal (184-191). But these works are referential and
require background knowledge that might reduce their potency, features that
the artists imply might also have been by design.5
Is Justice under threat as a virtue and, correspondingly, are the courts
threatened alongside the vulnerabilities currently being experienced by the
press and the postal service? The twenty-first century is uncovering a widening
gap between the lofty ideals and architecture of the court system and the
modern development and evolving doctrine of our courts.
Turning toward privatization models of justice, like various forms of
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as the
4.
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siphoning off of many cases into administrative adjudications, the authors
continue to explore the architecture of such alternative dispute settings while
questioning the values portrayed and reinforced by these shifts. For example,
administrative adjudications occur in nondescript offices, without the grace and
lofty architecture and art supporting an institutional commitment to Justice as
a virtue. Such adjudication proceedings are often hard to find; the proceedings
themselves contain fewer procedural protections, and there is correspondingly
less access to the decisions (317-318)6 Similar themes of restricted information
and access abound in mandatory arbitration proceedings, which are premised
upon confidentiality as a tool to promote open discussion—it is thought
that confidentiality is needed to resolve disputes in these forums.7 This has
the effect of removing the more mundane dispensations of justice from the
public sphere, a move the authors posit weakens norm development and
public education of adjudication’s role in a democracy, and which ultimately
undermines the democratic nature of the court system entirely. Although the
architecture of most modern courthouses aspires to signal permanence and
importance, the authors point to similar institutions, with grand architecture
and nods toward institutional permanence (the postal service and the press,
of course, but also schools, the military, and prisons) as harbingers of what
might befall courts in the twenty-first century—a privatization that brings with
it a strong blow to democracy and access (336).8 It is the behavior of the courts
in the everyday matters that most truly represents its democracy, and threats
to remove the role of courts in these more routine matters under the guise of
efficiency strike to the heart of this value.
It’s not only the more mundane dispensations of justice that are being
removed from Bentham’s tribunal of public opinion, however. The authors
include “Camp Justice” at Guantanamo Bay as another compelling instance
of the visual marketing of justice, portrayed in this case by glimpses of
individuals branded terrorists through barbed wire surrounding the detention
facility and images of rooms modeled after typical courtrooms (328-331). These
visual cues of justice, their portrayals of criminality and process, stood a vast
distance from the reality of the tribunals at Guantanamo, which turned away
from modern developments of courts as open and independent and as valuing
both sides of the dispute.9 While many have claimed that Guantanamo and
its processes were isolated examples, the authors’ main point is that courts are
6.
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See, e.g., Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedure and Long-Term Executive Detention,
86 D enver U. L. Rev. 961, 989 (2009) (describing in detail why “[t]he story of Guantanamo
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made up of many isolated practices and procedures and must function openly
both to safeguard the litigants’ rights and also to allow for continuous public
evaluation and education of the development of legal norms. In this sense, the
authors group Guantanamo alongside the other examples of privatization and
administrative adjudication as developments that together serve to weaken
adjudication’s role in democracy.
Switching from a historical focus, the authors begin to sketch what a
“democratic iconography” of courts might look like, focusing both on
architecture and function. First, there must be room in the new iconography
for an accessible discussion of oppression and recognition of the possibility
of injustice. An honest representation of the powerless can have great ripple
effects in advancing the dominant understanding of courts, like the building
of the South African Constitutional Court on the remnants of the jail that
held many of Apartheid’s resistors (350-356). On a more pragmatic level, they
advocate for the inclusion of social spaces in courthouses—here the authors
point to courthouses with educational programs, lecture spaces, and even
performance venues—as having both architectural and functional significance
to the development of democracy, expressing value to the public fitting for a
democratic house. Specialized courts with their attendant programs conjoined
(like family courts with spaces for social workers, children’s play spaces, and
other services relevant to the issues facing family court litigants) (343) also
exemplify a renewed focus on a democratically focused role for courts. The
architecture itself removes the resonating theme of punishment and instead
projects a more integrated government service.10
The authors circle back to Justice as a virtue ultimately, concluding that by
cutting Justice off from her sister virtues, virtues that can bring an iconography
of humility, reflection, and other less celebrated aspects of judging, we may
have become myopic in our view of the role of the courts. The tattered corduroy
jacket hanging in the county courthouse symbolizes a more honest image of
Justice, one to which we should aspire. Rather than merely a blindfold and
a scale, the jacket incorporates humility and humanity, bringing Justice into
truly full relief.
Professors Resnik and Curtis have charted a visually impressive and deeply
thought-provoking course through the art and architecture surrounding
justice as well as a history of the development of justice in popular opinion
and ultimately as a backbone of democracy. What’s more, they pose
challenging questions about the future of both justice and the court system.
Their point, that the future can be altered through a critical understanding of
the iconography and architecture surrounding our legal system, is ultimately
an inspiring one. While themes common to law professors and other legal
scholars echo throughout—the importance of transparency, accountability,
voice, and participation in law and representations of the legal system—the
10.

Along these lines, the authors discuss the use of glass as a building material (341-42). Glass
has obvious resonance of transparency, but also can signal more punitive associations, like
surveillance.
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presentation of these themes in a comprehensive art history is innovative and
enlightening. The subject matter transcends legal academia as well. Political
philosophers, art historians, cultural critics, and all those with a deep interest
in the role architecture and art can play in shaping democracy will find much
delight and insight in Representing Justice. And we can all take inspiration from
the idea that law is dynamic and that the people play a role in shaping what
happens to justice, and our courts, as we seek greater understandings of how
law is marketed to us, how law is seen and experienced by those in power and
by the powerless, and how the public needs to be able to interact with law to
keep it democratic.

